Regulatory and Policy Issues
The U.S. Role in Global Internet Governance
Derrick L. Cogburn, Milton Mueller, Lee McKnight, Syracuse University; Hans Klein, Georgia Institute of Technology; and John Mathiason, Syracuse University
Introduction
Who should control the Internet? A dozen years after the Internet became a mass medium, this issue has continued to grow in urgency, becoming white hot in fall 2005. At the September 2005 preparatory meeting for the UN World Summit on the Information Society (WSIS), a coalition of countries criticized the United States' unilateral control of the Internet's domain name system (DNS) and proposed the establishment of a multinational Council to supervise it [1, 2]. This proposal emerged from the Final Report of the UN Working Group on Internet Governance [3]. Researchers from the Internet Governance Project, a university-based consortium for policy analysis, have concluded that the United States should internationalize governance of the Internet, but in a way that avoids intrusive, centralized control.
Understanding Global Internet Governance
Internet governance refers to the making and enforcement of collective policies for the global Internet community. Many of these policies are quite technical (e.g., the policy for expanding the character sets used in domain names). However, they also have social and political consequences, such as the perception that a new global top-level domain for adult content (.xxx) would create a global red light district.
In practice, much of Internet governance boils down to physically managing the Internet's system of unique identifiers, such as domain names and IP addresses. In 1998 the U.S. government established an innovative approach to Internet governance by subcontracting these functions to a private not-for-profit corporation with international participation: the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) [4, 5]. Since its founding, ICANN has administered the DNS, introduced competition among domain name registrars, and created a dispute resolution process for trademark conflicts [6].
Despite these successes, ICANN has come under increasing pressure for reform. One reason is simply that governments want more influence over the Internet. They see ICANN as encroaching on their sovereignty. Another reason is that most global stakeholders worry about unilateral U.S. oversight. Political pressure on ICANN emanating from WSIS processes has zeroed in on this unilateral control: if the U.S. government has that power, why shouldn't others?
Not surprisingly, the U.S. government has resisted such pressure, sometimes to the point of seeming blind to the problem. In anticipation of the WSIS debates, the U.S. government released a "Statement of Principles" strongly reasserting its intention to maintain unilateral control of ICANN. It claims such control is necessary to maintain Internet "stability." By posing the argument in this way, the U.S. government hopes to frame the issue as incontrovertible. Of course, nearly everyone recognizes the importance of a stable and functioning Internet. However, the biggest problem with the U.S. "stability" argument is that this vague statement creates intense confusion about what it means or how it can be achieved. Surely, stability of the Internet cannot be simply "We're happy with the way things are now, so don't rock the boat."
In technical circles, stability usually means system stability against crashes, incompatibility, and perhaps security against denial of services attacks or intrusions. However, nothing the United States currently does as part of its oversight role contributes to Internet stability in this sense. From another perspective, political stability might mean that any attempt to move oversight of the DNS to some new and untested governance regime could be destabilizing. If this is the real rationale, the U.S. government should be willing to publicly commit itself to relinquishing unilateral control under the right conditions, and then to specify those conditions. It has not done that. On the contrary, it issued an unconditional claim to continued oversight.
The United States should take a different approach and reaffirm its support for the principles of the 1998 White Paper, which include an expectation that internationalization and privatization should supersede topdown unilateral governmental control, including control by the US government.
The Original U.S. Policy
As laid out in 1998, U.S. policy saw ICANN as international and private [7]. The basic idea was to make Internet governance international, not through a traditional intergovernmental organization (e.g., the International Telecommunication Union,) but through a private nongovernmental organization. That would keep the Internet's core coordinating functions free from national political rivalries and territorial jurisdictions. As originally conceived, ICANN was to be a technically oriented nonprofit corporation governing by means of private, globally applicable contracts. Its decision-making processes would allow participation by civil society, business, and the technical community, with consultation from governments.
The goals of that policy were laudable. It promised to shield the Internet from geopolitical manipulation while facilitating multi-stakeholder participation and distributing power more evenly. However, that original policy was never realized [5, 8]. In its June 2005 Statement of Principles, the United States eliminated its commitment to privatize ICANN, instead reasserting its unilateral control over the Internet, retaining ICANN only as a subcontractor. This statement precipitated conflict at the WSIS meeting; as long as one government monopolized authority to supervise ICANN, negotiate the terms of its contracts, and approve changes in the DNS root zone, Internet governance was neither internationalized nor privatized.
Risks in the U.S. Position
It is not usually best practice in poker to lay one's cards on the table before the hand is done, and international negotiations are no different. The U.S. government may be hesitant to make concessions when possible mechanisms for alternative governance structures are still unclear. However, there are significant risks in the current U.S. position.
First, continued unilateral control of the Internet's DNS does not increase stability. On the contrary, if oversight of the DNS is seen as a U.S. strategic national asset, rather than as a shared global infrastructure, the risks of deliberate disruption may actually increase.
Second, the status quo is only working for one government, and even the closest U.S. allies, Canada and the European Union, have now abandoned this perspective in favor of a more internationalized approach. In fact, conflict generated by the U.S. position threatens to undermine the very stability it has pledged to protect. United States unilateralism invites reciprocal actions. Other nations may support policies that will deglobalize the Internet and create territorialized authority. For example, while debates rage about technical feasibility, groups are exploring alternatives to the existing U.S. dominated root server (e.g., the Open Root Server Network) that may not coordinate with the existing global system. Also, the use of incompatible multinational domain name standards is growing, and certain countries are arguing for IP address allocation based on national territories. These developments would yield large national and linguistic blocs insulated from U.S. participation, and the global Internet would suffer.
Finally, the U.S. position undermines the legitimacy of ICANN. ICANN's representative mechanisms, already badly tarnished by the elimination of global elections in 2002, are increasingly seen as irrelevant. The real power is seen to lie with the United States. This perception was enhanced in the fall of 2005 when the United States effectively vetoed one of ICANN's decisions. The Commerce Department, prompted by domestic religious groups, told ICANN to reconsider .xxx, even though ICANN's decision-making processes had approved the new domain. Recently, the Economist painted the United States as a benign, nonintrusive oversight authority that should be allowed to continue unabated [9]. However, this last-minute intervention significantly undermines this argument. With U.S. oversight so obviously not neutral, why should other governments and Internet users accept it? It is inconsistent for the United States to assert that DNS management should be free of national interests while at the same time reserving to its own national government special and exclusive powers driven by national interest and domestic political pressure.
A Proposal for ICANN Oversight
Certainly, ICANN requires legal supervision and accountability mechanisms. As a private yet global organization, with regulatory and "taxing" powers over the domain name supply industry, ICANN has potentially expansive powers over Internet users. It needs government oversight. However, by "oversight" we do not mean arbitrary reviews, vetos, or second-guessing by a council of governments. That kind of oversight risks subjecting DNS management to the vagaries of geopolitics and undermining the efficient and fair administration of the Internet's unique identifiers.
ICANN needs lawful, rule-bound oversight. Governments should agree on clear limits to ICANN's responsibilities, and they should agree on means of enforcing those limits. True oversight means that well defined, internationally agreed rules or judicial processes should provide recourse if ICANN abuses its authority [9]. Internationalizing such oversight means that no single government can subject Internet governance to its national self-interest.
Toward a More Enlighted Future Role for the United States
Any transition raises short-term uncertainties, fears, and risks. That is why it is essential that the U.S. government take a cooperative and progressive role in Internet governance. The United States must accept the need for change and actively put forward viable ideas for the internationalization of its oversight and supervision functions. It is better to be proactive now than reactive later, when competing and hostile interests may threaten its control. The United States should be willing and able to advocate principles and norms of administration and governance that will preserve the freedom, openness, and innovation of the Internet, and obtain the binding agreement of other governments on those principles and norms [10].
References
[1] WSIS (2003a), WSIS Declaration of Principles, United Nations, WSIS-03/Geneva/doc/0004.
[2] WSIS (2003b), WSIS Action Plan, WSIS-03/Geneva/doc/0005.
[3] UN Working Group on Internet Governance, "Report of the Working Group on Internet Governance," Geneva, Switzerland, June 2005.
[4] NTIA, "Management of Internet Names and Addresses," white paper, Fed. Reg. 63:31741.
[5] M. Mueller, Ruling the Root: Internet Governance and the Taming of Cyberspace, MIT Press 2002.
[6] NTIA, Memorandum of Understanding Between the U.S. Department of Commerce and Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers, http://www.icann.org/general/icann-mou-25nov98.htm.
[7] U.S. Government, "U.S. Principles on the Internet's Domain Name and Addressing System," http://www.ntia.doc.gov/ntiahome/domainname/USDNSprinciples_06302005.htm
[8] IGP Working Paper, "What to Do About ICANN: A Proposal for Structural Reform," April 2005, http://dcc.syr.edu/miscarticles/IGP-ICANNReform.pdf.
[9] "Internet Governance: America Rules OK," Economist, 6 Oct., 2005.
[10] J. Mathiason, "Framework Convention: An Institutional Option for Internet Governance," Dec. 2004, http://dcc.syr.edu/miscarticles/igp-FC.pdf.