
In 1879, only three years after Bell invented the telephone, Emperor
Dom Pedro I inaugurated the first telephone exchange in Brazil. Since
then, most of the country's telecommunication infrastructure has been
kept in private hands. In 1972, the government created a holding
company, Telebrás, to build a completely new telecommunication
network from the debris of a deteriorated privately owned system.
In July 1997 the Brazilian government adopted the General
Telecommunications Law, which established a new regulatory framework
and initiated the process of deregulation of Telebrás. An
independent regulatory body called Agência Nacional de
Telecomunicaçoes (Anatel) was created to implement the changes
outlined in the General Law.
On 22 May, 1998 the 28 subsidiaries of the monopoly-holding
Telebrás System were restructured into 12 companies. This
created eight regional cellular operators, three fixed line
companies, plus a long-distance and international operator, Embratel.
On 29 July, 1998 the government's shareholdings in the 12 companies
were auctioned off, raising a total of US$ 19 billion.
Following the sale, Anatel announced that it would be issuing four
mirror concessions to act as competitors to the four fixed line
operators. The first two mirror licenses went to competitive tender
in 1998, and a third was awarded in April 1999. The final mirror
failed to attract bids in earlier auctions. In July 1999, Embratel
and its mirror, Bonari, were authorized to provide intraregional
long-distance services in competition with the local operators and
their mirrors. The local operators, however, will not be allowed to
offer interregional or international services until 2002 at the
earliest. At that date it is anticipated that the fixed line
telephony market will be opened to full competition with the
licensing of a number of new operators.
This article discusses the impact of globalization on the Brazilian
telecommunication market, the regulatory framework that has been
built to deal with this impact, and the role of the principal
players, taking into account the economic issues involved.
Telephony Market Overview
In the last decade the developing countries were hit by the urgent
"need" to restructure their telecommunications sector. This wave of
changes was a consequence of the fierce market competition already in
place in the developed countries, driving the capitalists to explore
new markets with high profit margins and zero competition:the
telecommunications monopolies in emerging countries.
Absorbed by the worldwide movement of openings and deregulations,
Brazil started its restructuring process in July 1997 when the
government adopted the new telecommunications law Lei Geral das
Telecomunicações no. 9472/97. Under the new regimen the
regulator body Agência Nacional de
Telecomunicações (Anatel) was created, and the rules
that would guide the privatization of the nationwide state-owned
Telebrás and the opening process to market competition were
defined.
Trying to legitimate the whole idea of privatization and
deregulation, the government committed to investing the accumulated
resources earned from the telecommunications sector sale on
education, health care, and welfare, and also to implementing the
concept of telecommunications services available to everyone
everywhere, internationally known as Universal Telecommunications
Service.
Checking the recent news, one realizes that the monopoly is over;
Telebrás and its group of 28 subsidiary companies were
completely sold, and the mirror companies are already in operation.
So far, the only things missing are the social benefits announced and
granted by the privatization supporters. It is time to question
"Where did the money from the privatization go?" In order to figure
out how much money is at stake, one can recall the whole deregulation
and privatization process in Brazil.
Telebrás spinoff happened in May 1998. The 28 subsidiaries
were reorganized into 12 companies: eight cellular operators
(Band-A), three fixed access companies (local/regional incumbent
telcos), and a long-distance and international operator (formerly
Embratel). Each company faces competition from its respective mirror
company. The government has gotten money from auctioning both
incumbent telcos (operation license, equipment plant, office
facilities, etc.) and mirror licenses (operation). Due to the obvious
advantage of the incumbents over the mirrors, the government imposed
some market protection in order to increase the market value of the
mirror licenses. Regarding "protection," one may say that Brazil kept
some restrictions on new competition that favors the companies
already in place. By the end of 2001 they were to consolidate their
businesses into duopoly or oligopoly environments. The licenses
expire in 2005, but can be renewed for the following 20 years. Fixed
access operators will not have to pay a license fee until 2005. After
that, every two years they will pay a license fee that is 2 percent
of their annual revenues.
Financial Analysis of the Auctioning Process in Brazil
The privatization of the telecom sector in Brazil was definitely
another hard learning process for the Brazilian people. Guided by
international interests, the government was a catalyst to the process
of economic control by the dominant economies.
Despite any globalization process, the government has to protect its
economy, which does not have the same growth rate, does not have the
same investment recovery profile, and is not protected by
internationally favorable trade agreements, as is the case for the
developed countries.
Unlike the telecom sector buyers, the balance of the Brazilian
treasury was badly managed. The economic crisis that hit the country
at the beginning of 1999 forced the devaluation of the local
currency, causing a terrible loss for the federal government, because
the companies were auctioned in reais, not in dollars, as informed by
the press (R$3.10 = US$1.00, August 2002).
The exchange rate was not the only drawback of the privatization
process. In order to catch the attention of investors, the government
invested US$26 billion in four years, preparing the system for
privatization. Considering that the total amount raised from the
auction was US$22 billion, there was an evident deficit in the
government account.
The total federal debt to international creditors is predicted to be
US$370 billion by the end of 2002, and the national revenue was only
US$110 billion in 2001. Increasing taxation was the solution for the
government to finance its activities. Currently, Brazilian citizens
pay approximately 40 percent of their salary in taxes, although the
federal debt continues to grow without limit.
Sérgio Motta, former Minister of Communications and mentor of
the Brazilian telecom sector reform, devised two special-purpose
funds that would be supported by a special tax collected from the
operating companies. The Universal Service Fund (Fust) would be used
to finance social investments, such as telecommunications service
provision in low profit areas. The Telecommunications Technological
Development Fund (Funttel) would be used to boost national technology
development. The two funds together raise resources on the order of
US$350 million, but the new Minister, Pimeta da Veiga, had already
announced that he will not pulverize that money in schools and
libraries.
So far, since the privatization took off, the main effect sensed by
Brazilian users was an increase in the phone bill. Before the reform
a telephone connection was US$0.50; now it is US$8.40. The average
monthly phone bill is around US$22.00, just for local calls. In the
United States, where income is at least five times higher than in
Brazil, the average bill is 60 percent of that value, with a much
better quality of service. The bottom line is: Brazilians are paying
more for the same service.
The penetration rate increased after privatization. In 1994 there
were 8.4 telephones/100 inhabitants and 5 cellular phones/100
inhabitants. Currently, there are 16 telephones/100 inhabitants and
7.2 cellular phones/100 inhabitants, and network digitalization
increased from 67 percent in 1998 to 81.6 percent in 1999. This
positive result must also be credited to the investment made by the
government right before telecom market deregulation.
Conclusions
The regulatory agency Anatel is responsible for supervising the
quality of telecommunication service, but it still has not shown
enough strength in punishing operators that provide substandard
services or disobey the rules for service provisioning. Anatel was
created in 1997 as a result of the new Telecommunications Law. It is
similar to the U.S. Federal Communications Commission (FCC), and is
now facing the same problem of manipulation by politicians and
powerful companies faced by the FCC in the past.
Following the General Telecommunications Law, Anatel's current
employees should hold their positions for only two years, and then a
new selection through a national contest should be done. The new
selection has not taken place yet, and the President is complaining
about a shortage of human resources to perform regulatory duties. As
a consequence, Brazil is still far from having communications
services compatible with international standards.
As of now, there is a net increase in unemployment in the
telecommunications market, caused by a downturn of the American
market. Embratel is facing a devaluation of its stock options due to
the bankruptcy of its parent company WorldCom. Telecom Italia's
holding company, Pirelli, is threatening to pull out of Brazil if it
cannot reach an agreement with Opportunity Bank owner Daniel Dantas.
Ericsson is laying off because Telecom Italia is its biggest client.
Telemar is also facing problems, but it will survive because it has
no ties to foreign companies. Telefonica is doing well in São
Paulo, although a recent devaluation of the Brazilian currency has
caused the shares of its parent company in Spainto plummet. Portugal
Telecom is holding its market value, and its operation is not
threatened in São Paulo. BCP is having problems, as well as
Vesper. Certainly, the market is quite different from that of just
two years ago.
Bibliography
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